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MY BODY, MY CHOICE: BIBLICAL, RABBINIC, AND 




Since the Supreme Court grounded the right to an abortion in a 
constitutional right to privacy, legal and societal debate has continued 
around the status of a fetus in utero, a woman’s countervailing claims, 
and the interests of states and society as a whole.  As American courts 
have faced an issue that intertwines legal, moral, and philosophical 
questions, so too the halakhic process confronts analogous 
complexities.  The main line of Jewish tradition makes a much-needed 
contribution to the discussion of abortion.  Without sharing the view 
that the fetus is from conception fully a person, it stops short of a 
complete dismissal of the value problem in destroying a fetus.  
However, whatever value attaches to “potential life,” the primary 
concern lies with the woman.  She exists.  Her voice and her needs 
must be heard.  And her life, (no matter how slim her chances of 
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MY BODY, MY CHOICE: BIBLICAL, RABBINIC, AND 
CONTEMPORARY HALAKHIC RESPONSES TO ABORTION 
In the forty-eight years since the Supreme Court grounded the 
right to an abortion in a constitutional right to privacy,1 legal and 
societal debate has continued around the status of a fetus in utero, a 
woman’s countervailing claims, and the interests of states and society 
as a whole.  When we examine the Jewish discussion surrounding 
abortion, we confront similar issues: the personhood of the fetus, the 
interest of the woman, and the quality of life anticipated both by the 
developing fetus and the bearing woman.  As American courts have 
 
1 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).  The Court in Roe determined that the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provided a fundamental right to 
privacy that encompassed a woman’s decision whether to terminate her pregnancy.  
Id. at 153.  The Court determined that the right was not absolute and said it must be 
balanced against the government’s interest in protecting her health as well as prenatal 
life.  Id. at 154.  In determining this balance, the Court established a trimester system.  
Id. at 164.  Under this system, a determination could be made as to state regulation 
of abortion.  In the first trimester, the abortion decision and its effectuation must be 
left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman’s attending physician.  In the 
second trimester, the State, in promoting its interest in the health of the mother, may, 
if it chooses, regulate the abortion procedure in ways that are reasonably related to 
maternal health.  In the third trimester, subsequent to viability, the State in promoting 
its interest in the potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even 
proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, 
for the preservation of the life or health of the mother.  Id. at 164-65.  The Court’s 
trimester system attempted to balance the rights of a woman to make this decision 
with the ability of the fetus to live outside the womb, which they said occurred after 
the second trimester of pregnancy. 
With respect to the State’s important and legitimate interest in potential 
life, the “compelling” point is at viability. This is so because the fetus then 
presumably has the capability of meaningful life outside the mother’s 
womb. State regulation protective of fetal life after viability thus has both 
logical and biological justifications. If the State is interested in protecting 
fetal life after viability, it may go so far as to proscribe abortion during 
that period, except when it is necessary to preserve the life or health of the 
mother. 
Id. at 163-64. 
However, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), overturned the Roe 
trimester framework, and replaced it with a viability analysis which opened the door 
to establishing abortion restrictions in the first trimester of pregnancy but only to 
safeguard the woman’s health.  Id. at 873-74.  Viability can be earlier than the third 
trimester, and any regulation—pre-viability—that imposes a substantial obstacle 
preventing a woman from obtaining a legal abortion is an undue burden that violates 
her constitutional right to abortion.  Id. at 877. 
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faced an issue that intertwines legal, moral, and philosophical 
questions, so too the halakhic process confronts analogous 
complexities. 
To understand the halakhic approach to this complex issue, we 
turn to many sources that assess the personhood of the fetus and the 
justification for allowing an abortion.  Many of the commentaries 
approach the topic by asking what is the status of the fetus?  Is it human 
life?  In the Torah (Hebrew Bible), we can find one source in Exodus 
that touches on the personhood of the fetus: 
When men fight and one of them pushes a pregnant 
woman and a miscarriage results, but no other damage 
ensues, the one responsible shall be fined according as 
the woman’s husband may exact from him, the payment 
to be based on reckoning. But if other damage ensures, 
the penalty shall be life for life, eye for eye, tooth for 
tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, burn for burn, would 
for wound, bruise for bruise.2 
This is understood by most biblical scholars to mean that as 
long as there is no fatal injury to the woman following her miscarriage, 
the inflictor only needs to compensate the husband financially for the 
loss of the fetus.  The fetus, then, is seen as possessing monetary value 
making one liable in tort.  For example, the Mekhilta (a source of 
midrashic halakha) explains that “no other damage” refers to the 
woman, and “the one responsible shall be fined” refers to 
compensation for the loss of the fetus.3  If the fetus is not a human life, 
then is it just excess tissue until born?  And if so, is there any problem 
with aborting a fetus, especially if its “quality of life” is taken to be 
minimal?  In the Talmud, we find reference that during the first forty 
days, the fetus should be considered mere fluid, “maya b’alma.”4  In 
other Talmudic passages, the fetus is described as “ubar yerekh imo,” 
translated, literally, as, a fetus is the thigh of the mother.5  Throughout 
 
2 Exodus 21, 22-25. 
3 See Mekhilta d’Rabbi Yishmael 21, 23; see also Babylonian Talmud, Bava 
Kamma 42a. 
4 Babylonian Talmud, Yevamot 69b. 
5 Babylonian Talmud, Hullin 58a; Babylonian Talmud, Gittin 23b. 
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rabbinic literature, we find recognition that although the fetus is not a 
person in a juridical sense,6 it nevertheless represents potential life.7 
As to the juridical status of the fetus, we turn to the Talmud in 
Sanhedrin 72b, which examines laws pertaining to using deadly force 
to stop a burglar who breaks into someone’s house.8  The sages taught 
that such a burglar is to be considered a “rodef,” a pursuer, and as such, 
anyone may kill a pursuer to rescue the one being pursued, without any 
kind of forewarning.  In discussing a minor who was pursuing another 
person in order to kill him, Rav Huna said that the pursued party could 
be saved by killing the pursuer.9  One of the other sages, Rav Hilda, 
raised an objection by referencing a baraita (a teaching in Jewish oral 
tradition not incorporated into the Mishnah) of a woman giving birth 
and her life being endangered by the fetus.  The life of the fetus may 
be sacrificed in order to save the mother.  But once its head has 
emerged during the birthing process, the fetus may not be harmed in 
order to save the mother because one life may not be pushed aside to 
save another life.10 
Rashi, commentator on the Hebrew Bible and Talmud, explains 
that the fetus in utero may be forfeited because lav nefesh hu, it is not 
a person.11  And yet, the rabbis understood a fetus as representing 
potential life.  For example, in the Talmud, dispensation is given to 
 
6 See generally Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 72b; see also Babylonian Talmud, 
Arrakhin 7a. 
7 See infra note 29 and accompanying text (explaining Maimonides’s different 
reasoning). 
8 Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 72b. 
9 Id. 
10 Mishnah Ohalot 7:6; Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 72b, translated in The 
William Davidson Talmud, SEFARIA, 
https://www.sefaria.org/Sanhedrin.72b?lang=bi (last visited Jan. 10, 2021).  Here, in 
the Gemara, an interesting question is raised as to why the rabbis would differentiate 
between a minor and a fetus: 
If one is permitted to save the pursued party by killing the minor 
who is pursuing him, why is this so? [After all,] [t]he fetus is a 
pursuer who is endangering his[/her] mother’s life. The Gemara 
answers: This is not difficult, as it is different there, with regard to 
the woman giving birth, since she is being pursued by Heaven. 
Since the fetus is not acting of its own volition and endangering 
[the] mother of [its] own will, [the] life [of the fetus] may not be 
taken in order to save its mother. 
Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 72b. 
11  See Rashi on Sanhedrin 72b. 
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violating the rules of Shabbat to save a fetus: “Desecrate one Sabbath 
on his behalf so that he will observe many Sabbaths) i.e. violate one 
Sabbath to stay alive and then be able to observe many more in the 
future)”12  Therefore, a fetus is to be treated with a certain reverence 
that would permit its destruction only in the most egregious 
circumstances; for example, if at any time the woman’s life is in 
danger.  The Mishnah discusses this conflict in graphic terms and 
directs us to tear the fetus apart limb by limb, if necessary, in the event 
of a threat to the mother.  But once the majority of the fetus has 
emerged (understood to be its head), it is considered a fully living 
person and cannot be touched; as we cannot set aside one life for 
another.13 
When we examine contemporary responsa, we see some 
decisors expanding the category of risk to the woman.  The first 
halakhic source that incorporated psychological suffering is found in a 
responsa from Rabbi Jacob Emden (eighteenth century).14  He 
discusses the permissibility of an abortion for a married woman 
pregnant from an adulterous union.15  In allowing the abortion to take 
place, he relied on what he called the “great need” and “great pain” 
(tzar gadol) of the mother; that is, the anguish she would suffer from 
the prospect of bearing a child, a “mamzer” (bastard), from an illicit 
affair.16  In a twentieth century responsum, Rabbi Eliezer Waldenberg 
 
12 See Babylonian Talmud, Yoma 85b; see also Chiddushei Ramban on Nidda 44b 
(regarding desecrating Shabbat for the possibility of saving the fetus’s life); 
Babylonian Talmud, Arakhin 7b. 
13 See sources cited supra note 10 and accompanying text; see also Shulkhan Arukh, 
Hoshen Mishpat 425:2. 
14 See Responsa of Rabbi Jacob Emden, Sh’eelat Yavetz 1:43. 
15 Id.  Under Jewish law, a child is only classified as a bastard if the mother is married 
and the child was born from an affair or the mother did not receive a Jewish divorce 
from her former husband and bears a child from a new relationship.  See 
Deuteronomy 23:2 (King James); Mishnah Yevamot 4:13; Shulchan Aruch, Even 
HaEzer 4:19. 
16 Responsa of Rabbi Jacob Emden, Sh’eelat Yavetz 1:43; see also Rabbi Judah D. 
Bleich, Abortion in Halakhic Literature, 10 TRADITION: J. ORTHODOX JEWISH 
THOUGHT 72, 102-03 (1968); DAVID M. FELDMAN, MARITAL RELATIONS, BIRTH 
CONTROL, AND ABORTION IN JEWISH LAW 288-89 (1974); see also Rabbi Bacharach, 
Chavat Yair, no. 31 (who saw no legal bar to abortion in the case of an adulterous 
woman but did not sanction it on sociological grounds i.e. as a safeguard against 
further immorality); cf. Rabbi Yosef Chaim of Baghdad, Even Haezer, in 1 
RESPONSA PE’ALIM 4 (19th-20th cent.) (the Ben Ish Chai); Rabbi Jacob ben Asher, 
Yoreh Deah, in 1 RESPONSA RAV PE’ALIM 14.  When the Ben Ish Chai was asked 
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concluded that in principle, an abortion is permissible as late as the 
sixth month of pregnancy if tests revealed a Tay-Sachs or Down’s 
Syndrome/genetically anomalous fetus.17  In justifying an abortion 
even at that late date (and even in the case of an indefinite diagnosis), 
his concern was not the possibility of a physical threat to the mother 
but rather the risks to her mental health.18  In this teshuvah, R. 
Waldenberg notes that “psychological suffering is in many ways much 
greater than physical distress.”19  Rabbi David Feldman explained that 
the principle that the mother's “pain comes first,” however, is the most 
pervasive of all factors in the consideration of the abortion question.20  
In his view, if a woman seeks an abortion on the grounds that the born 
child would have diminished physical or mental/neurological capacity, 
permission should be declined; after all, Jewish law does not grant 
permission to kill those born with any type of defect.21  “If, however, 
an abortion for [the] same potentially deformed child [is] sought on the 
grounds that the possibility is causing severe anguish to the mother, 
permission would be granted.”22  Various decisors differ on 
consideration of health including mental health risks as a ground for 
abortion.  For example, former Israeli Chief Rabbi, Rabbi Issur 
Unterman, viewed abortion as akin to murder and permitted it only in 
the case of saving the life of a mother;23 while former Chief Rabbi, 
Rabbi Ben Zion Uziel, allowed an abortion if it was intended to serve 
the mother’s physical needs, even if not life threatening.  In this case, 
it was to save the mother from a doctor’s diagnosis of probable 
deafness if the woman continued with the pregnancy.24  Rabbi Shlomo 
Zalman Auerbach allowed a woman who was raped to use a method to 
prevent a pregnancy due to the extreme emotional toll of carrying the 
 
whether a married woman who became pregnant from an affair could have an 
abortion, he declined to specifically answer but instead referred the questioner to 
three earlier opinions including Rabbi Bacharach and Rabbi Emden’s Teshuvot.  See 
BEN ISH HAI, 1 RESPONSA RAV PE’ALIM 4 (1903). 
17 Rabbi Eliezer Waldenberg, Tzitz Eliezer, 13:102, 14:102. 
18 Id. at 13:102. 
19 Id. 
20 FELDMAN, supra note 16, at 294. 
21 Id. at 292. 
22 Id. at 292 (emphasis omitted). 
23 See Be-inyan Pikuach Nefesh Shel Ubar, in NO’AM 6 (1963). 
24 Responsa of Rabbi Ben Zion Uziel, Mishpitei Uziel, Hoshen Mishpat 3:46. 
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fetus to term.25  Rabbi Moshe Feinstein only permitted an abortion if a 
doctor determined that the mother faced a high likelihood of dying if 
the pregnancy would continue.26  He also disagreed with Rabbi 
Waldenberg’s position permitting aborting a fetus with Tay-Sachs; in 
fact, Rabbi Feinstein prohibited it unless there was almost absolute 
certainty that the mother would succumb to grief.27 
Rabbi Eliezer Melamed (Twenty-first Century Israel) has 
written regarding a case of a woman’s emotional illness which cannot 
be treated with medicine and it is caused by the pregnancy.  He points 
out that “since emotional illness is generally considered a threat to life, 
she may abort her fetus to protect her life”.28 
When we review the decisions by some decisors to allow 
abortion, in the main they reject the invitation to assess the quality of 
life anticipated by a fetus diagnosed in utero with diminished physical 
and neurological defects.  To do otherwise, they reason, would be to 
think that we are God, capable of determining the quality of life 
suitable to being born.29  Jewish tradition is committed to the sanctity 
of life.  However, though it has been unwilling to evaluate the fetus’s 
anticipated quality of life, the qualitative interests of the woman, 
whose life and mental well-being are at stake, are primary.  Although 
halakhic sources do not recognize either a “right to privacy” or a “right 
of ownership” of one’s body in the same vein as understood by the 
Supreme Court/American Jurisprudence,30 Jewish law views the well-
 
25 See Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Auerbach & Rabbi Yehoshua Neuwirth, Hoshen 
Mishpat, in 3 NISHMAT AVRAHAM 262, 262-77 (2004). 
26 Rabbi Moshe Feinstein, Igros Moshe, Hoshen Mishpat 2:69; Rabbi Moshe 
Feinstein, Igros Moshe, Even Haezer 1:65. 
27 Id.  In addition, Rabbi Feinstein did not permit an abortion where the pregnancy 
was the result of an affair and the child would be classified as a mamzer.  R. Yechiel 
Yaakov Weinberg, Seridei Eish permitted a woman who contracted German measles 
during her pregnancy to have an abortion.  Responsa of R. Yechiel Yaakov 
Weinberg, Seridei Eish 3:127 (Jerusalem, 1966).  Doctors had advised that the fetus 
would be born with severe physical and mental defects including blindness or 
deafness.  Id. 
28 See https://ph.yhb.org.il/14-09-12/  
29 See Jakubovits, infra note 32. 
30 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).  Jewish tradition teaches that we were 
created in the image of God and our bodies are viewed as being on loan from God.  
As the “custodians’ of our bodies,” we need to treat them with reverence and not 
harm, permanently mar, nor destroy our bodies.  See, e.g., Genesis 9:5; Leviticus 
19:28.  In addition, the concept of privacy in Jewish law manifests itself in visual 
privacy-modesty and damage caused by looking.  See Genesis 9:20-27; Mishnah 
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being of the woman as paramount.31  Rabbi Immanuel Jakobovits 
(former Chief Rabbi of the United Kingdom) explained the balancing 
of fetal personhood and physical and mental health risks to the mother 
as, on the one hand, a refusal to grant full human inviolability to the 
unborn child from conception, and on the other hand, clear recognition 
that potentiality for life must not be compromised except for the most 
substantial medical reasons.32 
We do find that one strain in Jewish thought does come close 
to treating the fetus as a person.  It is true that after the fetus's head 
emerges, it is considered a person.  However, one might infer from 
Maimonides’ reasoning about a fetus who threatens the life of the 
mother, that a fetus is considered a person in utero.33  Rambam 
reasoned that a threatening fetus should be considered as akin to a 
pursuer, k-rodef: if only persons are pursuers, then Rambam's analysis 
presupposes that the fetus is a person or at least akin to a person.34  Yet 
there is no reason to assume that the conditions for being treated as an 
aggressor are the same as for being treated as a person.  Even if the 
fetus is not a person, it cannot be treated as though it were like external 
tissue, say a fingernail,35 and discarded cavalierly.  Indeed, there are 
some Halakhists who regard induced abortion as tantamount to 
 
Bava Batra 3:7; Bava Batra 60a; Shulchan Aruch, Hoshen Mishpat 154:7 (forbidding 
standing at one’s window and looking into your neighbor’s courtyard, lest you harm 
your neighbor by looking into their private space).  This does not match the 
constitutional understanding of privacy. 
31 See generally Eric Schmitt, After Battle on Abortion, A Struggle to Recover, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 12, 1990, at B1.  A poignant example of the conflict between the well-
being of a woman and fetus occurred in February 1989 when Nancy Klein, eighteen 
weeks pregnant, was in a car accident that left her comatose.  Id.  Her husband’s legal 
battle to be appointed her legal guardian and have the fetus aborted was supported 
by all segments of the Jewish community, which manifested outrage at the attempts 
to deny this Jewish woman, whose life was at stake, an abortion.  Id.  “Despite fears 
that Mrs. Klein might never come out of her coma, she did on January 12, 1990, and 
began her long road to recovery, learning to talk, walk, and regain her memory.”  
Editorial, The Chutzpah of Pro-Lifers, THE JEWISH PRESS, Feb. 24, 1989, at 5. 
32 See Immanuel Jakobovits, The Status of the Embryo in the Jewish Tradition, in 
THE STATUS OF THE HUMAN EMBRYO 66 (G.R. Dunstan & M.J. Sellars eds., 1988); 
Immanuel Jakobovits, Jewish Views on Abortion in Jewish Bioethics, in JEWISH 
BIOETHICS 118 (Fred Rosner & J. David Bleich eds., 1979); see also Rabbi 
Unterman, Hatorah VHamedinah 25, 29 (4th ser. 1952). 
33 See Mishneh Torah, Hilchos Rotzeach uShmirat Nefesh 1:9. 
34 See id. 
35 See Seymour Siegel, A Bias for Life, 5 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 23, 24 (1975). 
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homicide.36  However, their statements should be carefully scrutinized 
in each case to determine whether they express recognition of a fetus’s 
personhood, or rather a concern about a “slippery slope” from abortion 
to infanticide, which would certainly be considered homicide.  For 
example, in the view of Rabbi J. David Bleich, Judaism regards the 
killing of an “unborn child” to be a serious moral offense, to be 
performed only for the gravest of reasons.  Judaism, he says is opposed 
to abortion on intrinsic grounds, not simply because it may lead to 
infanticide, but in addition because the erosion of sensitivity to the 
sanctity of human life magnifies the odium associated with abortion.37  
Yet, the dominant line of thought in the Jewish sources is that the 
health and well-being of the fetus is considered from the standpoint of 
the fetus’s impact on the woman. 
To appreciate the implications of this rabbinic view, which puts 
the woman first, it’s illuminating to look at several ethical problems 
that first arose in the 1980’s and 1990’s that required a halakhic 
assessment of abortion; some of these issues still remain an ethical 
challenge today.  Beginning in the 1980’s, with the development and 
increased use of assisted reproductive technological treatments, 
including fertility drugs, in vitro fertilization, and ovarian stimulation, 
there was a large increase in multifetal pregnancies.38  Ethical 
questions arose concerning women carrying three or more fetuses.  
Carrying so many fetuses to term generated a double risk: first, 
exposing women to greater risks to their health in general, including a 
larger increase in the risk of maternal morbidity and mortality; and 
second, the increase of perinatal morbidity and mortality would 
minimize the possibility that any of the fetuses would be born alive or 
survive the birth trauma.39  Under these circumstances, was it 
 
36 See id. 
37 See RABBI J. DAVID BLEICH, JUDAISM AND HEALING: HALAKHIC PERSPECTIVES 
103 (2002); see also Issur Unterman, B’Inyan Pikuach Nefesh Shel ‘Ubar, in 6 
NOAM, 1963, at 1-11; Daniel Korobkin, Open Debate: Is N.Y.’s Abortion Law 
Halachic?, JEWISH J. (Feb. 6, 2019) 
https://jewishjournal.com/commentary/analysis/293441/open-debate-is-n-y-s-
abortion-law-halachic/Abortion (discussing recent revision of the New York 
Abortion law Reproductive Health Act signed January 22, 2019 that split Orthodox 
rabbinic opinion). 
38 See JOYCE A. MARTIN ET AL., TRENDS IN TWIN AND TRIPLET BIRTHS, D.H.H.S. 
No. 99-1120, at 2 (1999). 
39 Committee Opinion, Multifetal Pregnancy Reduction, AM. COLL. OF 
OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS (Sept. 2017), 
9
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halakhically permissible to reduce the number of fetuses by aborting 
some to allow others to be born?  At a conference held at the Mount 
Sinai School of Medicine, Rabbi David Feldman argued that it would 
be permissible to reduce the number of fetuses carried to term.40  The 
relevant halakhic standard utilized would be the increased health risk 
to the mother of carrying so many fetuses.  In addition to the physical 
danger, he identified a high mental health risk to the mother of 
delivering stillborn infants or those likely to die.  In his analysis, the 
risk that a fetus would be born with diminished physical or 
neurological function was not a compelling halakhic reason for 
abortion; nor was the economic burden that a family would incur with 
so many children.  The justification for fetal reduction, in his eyes, had 
to be the health risks endangering the woman.41 
Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, when faced with two cases, 
a woman with a pelvis too small to support a pregnancy with 
quadruplets and a woman pregnant with sextuplets, allowed reduction 
of fetuses, due to the high risk that the pregnancy would end in 
miscarriage of all the fetuses.  He based his decision on the rodef 
standard: each fetus had the status of rodef, but here the fetuses were 
pursuing each other.42  While other rabbinic authorities posited that the 
abortions should be done as early as possible, during the first forty days 
when the fetus is considered maya b’alma- mere water, Rabbi 
Auerbach allowed the abortion of any of the fetuses even after the first 
forty days of gestation as the procedure was safer when done later.  
Rabbi Yitzchak Zilberstein raised the question of whether in the case 
 
https://www.acog.org/clinical/clinical-guidance/committee-
opinion/articles/2017/09/multifetal-pregnancy-reduction.  In the intervening years, 
physicians have been able to decrease the incidences of multifetal pregnancy by 
limiting the numbers of embryos transferred or by cancelling a gonadotropin cycle 
when the ovarian response suggests a high risk of a multifetal pregnancy.  Id. 
40 Dr. Richard Berkowitz & Rabbi David Feldman, Medical Ethics: The Jewish Point 
of View: Selective Reduction of Multi-fetal Pregnancies at Mount Sinai School of 
Medicine, 51 MOUNT SINAI J. MED., Nov. 1988. 
41 See id.; see also Dr. Richard L. Berkowitz et al., Selective Reduction of Multifetal 
Pregnancies in the First Trimester, 318 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1043, 1043-47 (1988); 
John C. Hobbins, Selective Reduction–A Perinatal Necessity?, 318 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 1062, 1062-63 (1988); ABRAHAM S. ABRAHAM, THE COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE 
TO MEDICAL HALAKHA 206 (1990). 
42 See Daniel Eisenberg, Multifetal Pregnancy Reduction in Jewish Law, AISH (Jan. 
18, 2004), https://www.aish.com/ci/sam/48949016.html (citing Rabbi Yitzhak 
Zilberstein, Induced Abortion for Multiple Fetuses, 8 ASSIA, 1995, at 7-13). 
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of a pregnancy that did not directly threaten the life of the pregnant 
woman, a physician was permitted to reduce the number of fetuses, 
which could lead to the appearance of choosing one “life” over 
another.  He referenced the case in the Talmud where bandits attack a 
group and ask their captives to give up one member of their group to 
be killed or else all of them will be executed.43  He pointed out that 
while the Talmud and most authorities ruled that the entire group 
would have to die rather than turning over anyone, some authorities 
allowed a lottery where an innocent person was chosen to be handed 
over to save the rest of the group.44  At times in very limited 
circumstances people could be sacrificed to save the larger group. 
Based both on this concept and due to the fetuses not being yet fully 
viable humans and being in utero, Rabbi Zilberstein permitted multi 
fetal reduction.45  Rabbi Zilberstein also concluded that since it is 
likely that all the fetuses may die if they are all left in utero, he 
permitted reduction to save some of the fetuses.46  Rabbinic opinion 
has also weighed in as to how one chooses which fetuses to abort.  For 
example, is it permissible to choose to abort a fetus with genetic 
abnormalities?  One rabbinic authority, Rabbi Eliezer Waldenberg, 
ruled that one could if it was likely to die in utero and pose a risk to 
the remaining healthy fetuses.47 
At the 1988 conference, physician Dr. Richard Berkowitz 
added that many, if not most physicians, would refuse to reduce the 
number of fetuses to fewer than two, even if the parents do not want 
more than one child.48  In more recent years, anecdotal evidence points 
to more physicians being open to a patient’s choice to reduce to a 
singleton and instead allowing for patient choice, especially given 
 
43 See Palestinian Talmud, Terumot 8:10; see also Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, 
Yesodai HaTorah 5:5. 
44 See sources cited supra note 43. 
45 See Daniel Eisenberg, Multifetal Pregnancy Reduction in Jewish Law, AISH (Jan. 
18, 2004) https://www.aish.com/ci/sam/48949016.html (citing ASSIA MAGAZINE, 
no. 45-46, 1989, at 12:1-2, reprinted in Rabbi Yitzhak Zilberstein, Induced Abortion 
for Multiple Fetuses, 8 ASSIA, 1995, at 7-13). 
46 Id.  He analogized it to people trapped under a collapsed building.  By using a 
tractor to try to save some of the people buried under the rubble, it could kill others 
while searching for survivors but also many more could be rescued.  Yet by doing 
nothing, it would lead everyone to die.  Id. 
47 Rabbi Eliezer Yehuda Waldenberg, Tzitz Eliezer, 20:2. 
48 See Berkowitz & Feldman, supra note 40. 
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increased health risks to carrying twins.49  Halakhic opinion in the 
main rejects reducing fetuses from twins to singletons for reasons other 
than risk to a woman’s health.50  An additional ethical issue which also 
arose concerned the technological ability to determine the sex of the 
fetuses and using gender as a criterion for which fetuses to choose or 
reduce.  Aborting a fetus not of the desired sex was deemed 
halakhically unacceptable.51  And in the words of one medical 
recommendation from the American Society for Reproductive 
Medicine, “when two or more fetuses are equally accessible and there 
is no medical benefit to reducing one over another, the physician 
should randomly select the fetus to be reduced, therefore eliminating 
physician bias or subtle discrimination in making this 
determination.”52  The use of sex alone as a consideration in 
determining which fetus to reduce, poses ethical challenges that are 
beyond the scope of this Committee Opinion and are discussed by 
others elsewhere.53  The criteria then that are used in selecting those to 
 
49 See Mark Evans & David Britt, Multifetal Pregnancy Reduction: Evolution of the 
Ethical Arguments, 28 SEMINARS REPRODUCTIVE MED. 295, 300 (2010). 
Historically, controversy has surrounded decisions regarding 
reduction of twin or higher-order multifetal pregnancies to a 
singleton. For some women, a multifetal pregnancy reduction to a 
singleton may be an appropriate or desired option for medical 
reasons or nonmedical reasons, such as financial, social, or 
emotional concerns. Certain medical or obstetric considerations 
can significantly increase the risks of carrying even a twin 
pregnancy compared with a singleton pregnancy. Specific 
examples include a müllerian anomaly, a history of cervical 
insufficiency, or preeclampsia with severe features in a previous 
pregnancy. During patient counseling, physicians should consider 
discussing reduction to a singleton pregnancy based on their 
understanding of the particular patient, her unique medical 
situation, and her values. When a woman with a twin gestation 
requests such information, whether for medical or nonmedical 
reasons, it should be provided in a timely manner and without bias. 
Committee Opinion, supra note 39.  
50 See Richard V. Grazi & Joel B. Wolowelsky, Multifetal Pregnancy Reduction and 
Disposal of Untransplanted Embryos in Contemporary Jewish Law and Ethics, 165 
AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1268, 1270 (1991). 
51 Id. 
52 See Ethics Comm. of the Am. Soc. for Reproductive Med., Use of Reproductive 
Technology for Sex Selection for Nonmedical Reasons, 103 FERTILITY & STERILITY 
1418, 1418-22 (2015). 
53 Id. 
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be aborted are medical, that is, the chances of survival.  The 
justification that physicians who perform fetal reduction rely on is if 
action is not taken, all may die.  This is a typical halakhic conundrum 
of choosing which life to save, often under conditions of limited 
resources.  A decision must be made; and as we have seen earlier, if 
we sit idly by, we will be letting those die who might be saved.54 
In recent years, though, the debate around pre-natal sex 
selection has evolved with the technology surrounding implanting 
embryos.  In general, halakhic views of embryos, which can be a day 
old but are less than eight weeks old, differs from the status of a fetus.55  
Halakhic opinions have stated that all non-transplanted embryos 
artificially fertilized in vitro have no standing as fetuses in Jewish 
law.56  Rabbi Haim David HaLevi, (former Chief Rabbi of Tel Aviv), 
ruled, “(O)ne may discard them (embryos) if they were not chosen for 
implanting; as the law of abortion applies only to [procedures in] the 
womb . . . [b]ut in vitro, as was said, there is no prohibition at all.”57  
Rabbi Mordechai Eliyahu, former Chief Rabbi of Israel, stated that “all 
eggs which are destined to be implanted in the mother’s womb should 
not be destroyed, as a live fetus will yet develop from them. But those 
 
54 On this point there is a debate in rabbinic literature.  See Babylonian Talmud, 
Pesachim 25b; Babylonian Talmud, Bava Metziah 62a; Rabbi Moshe ben Maimon 
(“Maimonides”), Hilchot Yesodei haTorah 5:5; Rabbi Joseph Karo, Kessef Mishneh 
Rotzeach 1:14. 
55 See Rabbi Yitzchok Breitowitz, The Preembryo in Halacha, JEWISH LAW 
ARTICLES, https://www.jlaw.com/Articles/preemb.html (last visited Aug. 26, 2021) 
(quoting Rabbi Haim David HaLevi, On Fetal Reduction, 12 ASSIA, 1990, at 47-48 
(1990) (“The law of abortion applies only to procedures in the womb but in vitro, 
there is no prohibition at all.”)); Id. (quoting 8 MOSHE STERNBUCH, BISHEVILAI 
HAREFUAH 29 (Kislev 5747) (“The prohibition against abortion is in the woman’s 
uterus for [the embryo] has the potential to develop and become complete in her 
womb and it is destroyed.  This also appears to be the implicit assumption of R. Shaul 
Yisraeli in an essay published as an Appendix to the Entzyclopedia Hilchatit Refuit, 
Volume 4, where he discusses the Nachmani case.”)).  See also Donating Excess 
Embryos, NISHMAT’S WOMEN’S HEALTH & HALACHA (Feb. 8, 2005), 
https://www.yoatzot.org/questions-and-answers/1063. 
56 Grazi & Wolowelsky, supra note 50, at 1289. 
57 Grazi & Wolowelsky, supra note 50 (quoting Rabbi Haim David HaLevi, 
Responsum to Richard Grazi, 12 ASSIA, 1990, at 47-48).  
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eggs which have not been chosen for implantation may be 
discarded.”58 
However, the development of an in vitro process known as pre-
implementation genetic diagnosis (“PGD”) has led to diverse halakhic 
views regarding sex selection in embryos.  In the newest form of PGD, 
scientists do a Trophectoderm biopsy on day five or six.  They take 
cells at the blastocyst stage of development from embryos created via 
in vitro fertilization. 
This is a newer technique that utilizes biopsy at a later 
stage of embryonic development. At the blastocyst 
stage there has been some differentiation of the cells 
into an inner cell mass (destined to become the fetus) 
and the trophectoderm (precursor to the placenta). A 
small portion of the trophectoderm cells are removed 
for the biopsy. The inner cell mass is not disturbed.59 
Since the embryos need to be transferred by day five or six, and 
it takes twenty-four hours to get the result back from the biopsy, the 
embryos will be frozen “and subsequently thawed and transferred later 
after results of testing are available.  Trophectoderm biopsy is less 
traumatic to the embryos than blastomere biopsy and therefore results 
in a higher success rate.”60 
Through this type of genetic testing prior to implantation, PGD 
is used to screen for genetic diseases and disorders as well as see if 
embryos have compatible tissue for a sick sibling.  PGD is also 100% 
effective in identifying the sex of the embryo, which has been helpful 
in screening for gender linked diseases such as hemophilia.61  “About 
85% of Americans Jews have an Ashkenazi Jewish background, 
originating from Eastern or Central Europe; as many as 1 in 4 Ashkenazic 
Jews is a carrier of an AJ genetic condition.”62 
 
58 Id. (quoting Rabbi Mordechai Eliyahu, Responsum to Richard Grazi, in 11 
TECHUMIN 272, 272 (1991)). 
59 See PGD, Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis for genetic Disorders, ADVANCED 
FERTILITY CTR. CHI., https://advancedfertility.com/fertility-treatment/ivf/pgd/ (last 
visited Aug. 26, 2021). 
60 Id. 
61 See Leslie A. Pray, Embryo Screening and the Ethics of Human Genetic 
Engineering 1 NATURE EDUC. 207 (2008). 
62 What is the Ashkenazi Jewish Genetic Panel?, WEBMD, 
https://www.webmd.com/a-to-z-guides/ashkenazi-jewish-genetic-panel (last visited 
Aug. 26, 2021). 
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The use of PGD then, can be very helpful to avoid a child being 
born with a genetic condition.  Yet some of the moral challenges 
include a fear of a slippery slope leading to eugenics, unintended edits 
in DNA that can have dire long-lasting permanent effects,63 a fear of 
seeing PGD produced children as mere instruments, as well as gender 
bias among parents who may prefer boys over girls.64  While in many 
European countries boundaries have been put in place regarding 
assisted reproduction, including sex selection, the United States has 
not prevented PGD for sex selection.65  The State of Israel has one of 
the highest uses of reproductive technology (compared to the United 
States, Israel has 1,657 in vitro procedures per million people versus 126 
per million),66 and has responded to the use of PGD for sex selection by 
enacting certain requirements.  In the early 2000’s, two fervently 
Orthodox couples who needed to use donated sperm, wished to utilize 
 
63 See generally Amy Dockser Marcus, Gene Editing in Embryos Isn’t Safe or 
Effective for Clinical Use Yet, Report Says, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 3, 2020), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/gene-editing-embryos-should-be-only-for-disease-
prevention-report-says-11599145913. 
64 See Lily Kuo, China: New Rules To Prevent Sex-Selective Abortions Raise Fears, 
THE GUARDIAN (June 22, 2018), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/22/china-new-rules-jiangxi-
province-prevent-sex-selective-abortions (regarding a new rule in Jiangxi province 
stipulating that women more than fourteen weeks pregnant have to have signed 
approval from three doctors confirming an abortion is medically necessary before 
any procedure; this is seen as an attempt to prevent sex selection abortions which are 
illegal in China).  Sex selection abortions became very commonplace in the late 
1980’s in China (due to the one child rule) and India, where there was a strong 
preference for male children.  Id.  Using ultrasound machinery, they were able to 
determine the sex of the fetus; this led to unbalanced gender ratios.  Id.  India 
eventually banned prenatal sex selection in 1994.  Id.  See generally HANDBOOK ON 
PRE-CONCEPTION & PRE-NATAL DIAGNOSTIC TECHNIQUES ACT, 1994 AND RULES 
WITH AMENDMENTS, MINISTRY OF HEALTH & FAM. WELFARE (2006).  About 336 
million abortions have been performed in China since 1971, due to the one child rule.  
China was left with a massive gender imbalance of 30 million more men than women.  
In 2004, Guizhou province enacted the first ban on aborting female fetuses.  Id. 
65 Ariana Eunjung Cha, From Sex Selection to Surrogates, American IVF Clinics 
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gender selection when choosing which embryos to implant.  They 
sought Rabbinic/Hospital ethics committee approval of using PGD to 
determine the sex of the embryo for a non-medical reason.67  
Permission was granted, and it led the Israeli Ministry of Health on 
May 9, 2005, to allow gender selection for non-medical reasons.68  The 
regulations implemented only allow couples with four or more 
children of the same sex to apply.  Couples appear before a panel 
appointed by a health minister which includes an ethicist, psychologist, 
social worker, doctor and clergy of the applicant’s religion.69  
Additionally, they must provide written consent and prove that one or 
both parent’s mental health is at risk if they are not able to bear a fifth 
child of the preferred sex; the procedure is not covered by insurance.70  
As of 2015, out of 639 applications, the panel approved eighty-one 
cases.71 
 
67 Id.  In one case, the couple wanted a girl and not a boy.  The father was a Kohen 
and by using donated sperm, a son would not be considered a Kohen.  They wanted 
to avoid anyone in their community knowing the circumstances of the birth of their 
child, which would arise when a male child would not participate in any ritual 
connected to being of priestly lineage.  A second couple sought the complete opposite 
result- they wanted a female child as they followed a rabbinic opinion that with 
donated sperm, it may be considered yichud for a father to being in the same room 
with a daughter, who technically was not related to him.  In Jewish law, the laws of 
“Yichud” prohibits a man and a woman who are not married to each other to be 
secluded alone in a room or private space.  See id.; Judy Siegel-Itzkovich, Israel 
Allows Sex Selection of Embryos for Non-medical Reasons, 330 BEST MED. J. 1228 
(May 28, 2005); see also Richard V. Grazi & Joel B. Wolowelsky, Addressing the 
Idiosyncratic Needs of Orthodox Jewish Couples Requesting Sex Selection by 
Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis, 23 J. ASSISTED REPRODUCTION & GENETICS 
421, 424-25 (Dec. 2006). 
68 Grazi & Wolowelsky, supra note 50, at 423. For objection from outside the 
religious community, see 
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArtVty.jhtml?sw=traubman&itemNo=5782
74.  




71 Id. News reports have shown that Israeli Arab women travel to the West Bank to 
utilize PGD for sex selection. Doctors at the Razan Center for Infertility in Nablus 
perform more than 500 sex selection procedures a year, according to a clinic 
spokesperson. See Shaina Shealy, An Israeli Woman Traveled to the West Bank So 
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Some rabbis have opposed sex selection for personal parental 
satisfaction or even family balancing as antithetical to traditional 
Jewish values,72 while others approved it.73  Yet, at the heart of 
 
72 See Grazi & Wolowelsky, supra note 57, at n.6 (citing Rabbi Zilberstein, 
Selecting a Fetus for Implantation: Avoidance of Birth Defects and Determining 
Sex, 8 NOAM, Nov. 1991, at 47); see also Nishmat Avraham, Even Haezer 1:1 
(explaining how Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Auerbach who did not allow sex selection 
for family balancing but allowed it for avoiding hemophilia); see also R. Landau, 
Sex Selection for Social Purposes in Israel: Quest for the “Perfect Child” of a 
Particular Gender or Centuries Old Prejudice Against Women?, J. MED. ETHICS, 
Sept. 2007–Apr. 2008, at 1.  In 2006, the health ministry's chief adviser on ethics, 
the gynecologist and Orthodox rabbi Mordechai Halperin, declared that there is no 
justification in Jewish law for performing in vitro fertilization and preimplantation 
genetic diagnosis for couples who are not at high risk of genetic disorders and who 
do not have fertility problems. It would, however, be up to the committee to decide 
the exact criteria. See Judy Siegel Itzkovich, Israel Allows Sex Selection of 
Embryos for Non-Medical Reasons, THE BMJ (May 26, 2005), 
https://www.bmj.com/content/330/7502/1228.2.full.  
73 Tamara Traubmann, Doctors, Rabbis Call for End to Ban on Embryo Gender-
Selection, HAARETZ (Oct. 31, 2006), https://www.haaretz.com/1.4926998.  Rabbi 
Yuval Sherlo and Professor Noam Zohar, a bio-ethicist from Bar Ilan University, 
felt the restrictions were too great and Zohar opposed limitations in the name of 
individual freedom.  Id.   Dr. Richard Grazi and Rabbi Joel Wolowelsky cite Rabbi 
Ovadia Yosef who ruled that PGD for sex selection could be used by a couple who 
had six children of one sex and who would not have any more children unless they 
were sure that the seventh would be of the opposite sex; and R. Mordechai Eliyahu 
permitted sex selection for a couple who had five children of the same sex. See Joel 
B. Wolowelsky, Sex Selection and Halakhic Ethics: A Contemporary Discussion, J. 
ORTHODOX JEWISH THOUGHT, Vol. 40, No. 1, at 45-76 (2007).  The authors look to 
family balancing as having “a certain halakhic impetus. A man has not fulfilled the 
mitzvah of peru u-revu until he has a son a daughter (Shulhan Arukh, Even ha-Ezer 
1:5.”) Id. Rabbi Kenneth Brander notes “The Talmud (Shabbat 31a) lists a menu of 
questions asked to each of us after our passing in the heavenly court.  One of the 
questions is: ‘asakta be-pirya ve-rivya?’”  Id.  The Talmudic framing of this 
question is fascinating.   “Were you involved in trying to fulfill the commandment 
of procreation (of having a male and female child)?" Notice the phraseology of the 
question. It is not "kiyamta pirya ve-rivya"—did you fulfill the mitsva or 
procreation, but rather, did you try? Having a male and female child is not in our 
hands. Our responsibility is to try to have both genders. This concern seemed to 
resonate in a written dialogue between R. Menachem Burstein, dean of Machón 
Puah, and various posekim in Israel. Among the questions that Rabbi Burstein 
posed in letters to key posekim was the question of using PGD for preventing 
genetic anom alies as well as for gender selection.”  See Kenneth Brander, Playing 
God: Can I Choose my Child? PGD and Genetic Screening (Feb. 1, 2006), 
http://www.yutorah.org/ showShiur.cfm?shiurID=713523.   
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rabbinic approval for use of sex selection in the two cases cited above, 
was the degree of despondency and mental anguish that either one of 
the parents could experience.  It calls to mind the same halakhic factors 
that rabbis have used in cases of women who seek abortions.  
Procreative liberty, beneficence, and autonomy74 might be secular 
considerations, allowing for either an abortion or gender selection, but 
when employing a halakhic analysis, the decision is based on a mental 
health factor — severe risks to the mental health of either the husband 
or wife.75 
Another ethical dilemma that has arisen concerns fetal tissue 
research.  Fetal tissue is any tissue or organ obtained from a fetus that 
was fertilized at least eight weeks earlier, or from an embryo, which is 
from implantation until the eighth week of pregnancy.76 
Scientists use human fetal tissue to study and develop 
therapies for diseases and conditions from diabetes to 
congenital heart defects to blindness. They also use the 
tissue to develop mice with humanlike immune systems 
to conduct research on infectious diseases, particularly 
HIV. Such mice could also be useful in the fight against 
the new coronavirus, proponents argue. In 2018, 
scientists at an [National Institute of Health] meeting, 
attended by [Health and Human Services] leaders, 
argued that human fetal tissue remains the “gold 
 
Sephardic Chief Rabbi Amar permitted PGD for genetic reasons, as well as for 
peru u-revu, and shalom bayit. However, others, including R. Yehoshua Neuwirth, 
R. Ariel, and R. Meir Nissim Mazouz pointed out concerns for such permissibility, 
except when it came to preventing genetic anomalies. R. Neuwirth warned that 
such permissibility creates an environment in which humankind begins to play God 
and warned against using PGD for this purpose.  
Id. at 55-56.   
74 Julian Savulescu, Sex Selection: The Case For, 171 MED. J. AUSTL. 373, 373-75 
(1999). 
75 However, left unclear is how significant it has been to the committee making 
decisions vis a vis mental distress if the desire of wanting a male child is to fulfill 
“be fruitful and multiply?  Or to carry on a family name in light of the Holocaust?  
Or the desire to have a male child to say kaddish? 
76 KAVYA SEKAR ET AL., CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44129, HUMAN FETAL TISSUE 
RESEARCH: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 8-10 (2019); see also Michelle 
Andrews, FAQ: How Does New Trump Fetal Tissue Policy Impact Medical 
Research?, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (June 7, 2019), https://khn.org/news/faq-how-
does-new-trump-fetal-tissue-policy-impact-medical-research. 
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standard” for developing such mice. In 2019, NIH spent 
$109 million on about 175 projects that used human 
fetal tissue; this year, it expects to spend $116 million.77 
In the 1980’s, ethical dilemmas arose related to media reports 
of women who became pregnant for the sole purpose of having an 
abortion and then donating fetal tissue after the abortion to provide 
anticipated aid to an individual, usually a blood relative, suffering from 
Parkinson's disease, diabetes, or Alzheimer's disease.78  In probing 
whether it was permissible, halakhically, to benefit from such a 
donation, some Jewish scholars distinguished between voluntary and 
spontaneous abortions.  A type of “exclusionary principle” was 
endorsed.  Donations from individuals who had undergone abortions 
for the sole purpose-of donating tissue were to be rejected; tissue 
donated from spontaneous abortions were acceptable.79  The argument 
was that benefitting from the donated tissue constituted approval and 
complicity in an impermissible abortion.80 
In responding to whether “research upon fetal tissue derived 
from an induced abortion implies moral acquiescence or complicity 
with the antecedent abortion,” Rabbi David Bleich noted that there is 
“no principle of Jewish law or ethics that would preclude the use of 
information gleaned as a result of unethical research.”81  Furthermore, 
“[a]lthough performance of an abortion is a grievous offense, Jewish 
law does not posit a ‘Miranda principle’ or an exclusionary rule that 
would, post factum, preclude use of illicitly procured tissue for an 
otherwise sanctioned purpose.”82  However, he too was concerned that 
 
77 Meredith Wadman, New U.S. Ethics Board Rejects Most Human Fetal Tissue 
Research Proposals, AM. ASS’N ADVANCEMENT SCI. (Aug. 18, 2020, 10:00 PM), 
https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2020/08/new-us-ethics-board-rejects-most-
human-fetal-tissue-research-proposals. 
78 See Christine Gorman, A Balancing Act of Life and Death. New Uses Of Fetuses 
And Brain-Absent Babies Trouble Doctors, 131 TIME, Feb. 1, 1988, at 49 (1988). 
79 J. David Bleich, Survey of Recent Halakhic Periodical Literature: Fetal Tissue 
Research: Jewish Tradition and Public Policy, 24 TRADITION: J. ORTHODOX JEWISH 
THOUGHT 69, 69 (1989). 
80 Id.  Subsequent federal law specified conditions under which human fetal tissue 
could be used in federally funded research involving fetal tissue for therapeutic 
transplantation including a ban on the woman donating knowing the identity of any 
recipient and prohibited the sale or trafficking; see also SEKAR, supra note 76, at 8-
10. 
81 Id. at 82. 
82 Id. 
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utilization of such tissue would involve collusion or encouragement of 
induced abortions, or any action or policy that would lead to an 
increase in the number of abortions performed.83 
The practice of tissue donation provoked national controversy.  
Federal moratoriums on fetal tissue research from elective abortions in 
federally financed scientific research were put in place during several 
presidential terms, ranging from Ronald Reagan to George H.W. Bush 
to Bill Clinton (who restored the research with bipartisan support).  
Most recently, the ban was reinstated by the Trump Administration in 
2019.84  This ban was short-lived, as the Biden Administration 
renewed researchers’ abilities to use fetal tissue shortly after taking 
office.85  Although there has been success in using stem cells from 
umbilical cords, as well as adult stem cells and organ lids, artificially 
grown cells that mimic organs, scientists still see great value in using 
fetal tissue, in particular from elective abortions.86 
The deep questions raised by abortion, as well as 
interconnected reproductive technologies and research, challenge us to 
assess the limits that ethical and moral sensibilities should impose on 
 
83 Id. at 82-84. 
84 See Andrews, supra note 76 (“[The Federal government announced that the] 
National Institute of Health would no longer conduct research with human fetal tissue 
obtained from elective abortions after using up any material that was on hand . . . . 
Federally funded research at other institutions could continue until their grants 
expired.”).  In addition, in July 2020, the Human Fetal Tissue Research Ethics 
Advisory Board, appointed by Health and Human Services Secretary Alex Azar, 
reviewed fourteen proposals to do medical research using human fetal tissue donated 
after elective abortions.  Id.  The applications made to the U.S. National Institutes of 
Health (“NIH”) had already been recommended for funding by scientific reviewers 
and had met existing legal requirements for ethical use of the tissue.  Id.  In August 
2020, the ethics board delivered the results to Secretary Azar and Congress and 
recommended that thirteen of them be rejected.  Id.  They were the first applications 
considered under the new regulations in which projects by extramural, NIH-funded 
scientists using human fetal tissue need to pass an extra layer of ethics review.  See 
Wadman, supra note 76; SEC’Y HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., N.I.H. HUMAN FETAL 
TISSUE RESEARCH ETHICS ADVISORY BOARD – FY2020 CHARTER (2020). 
85 See Apoorva Mandavilli, Biden Administration Ends Limits on Use of Fetal Tissue 
for Research, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 17, 2021), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/17/health/fetal-tissue-abortion-biden.html; see 
also Wadman, supra note 77. 
86 See Andrews, supra note 77.  In addition, most scientists see fetal tissue from 
elective abortions, rather than miscarriages, as generally superior because 
miscarriages often result from chromosomal or other abnormalities that could make 
the tissue not suitable for research.  Id. 
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a woman's Constitutional right to make reproductive decisions.  The 
main line of Jewish tradition makes a much-needed contribution to the 
discussion of abortion.  Without sharing the view that the fetus is from 
conception fully a person, it stops short of a complete dismissal of the 
value problem in destroying a fetus.  However, whatever value attaches 
to “potential life,” the primary concern lies with the woman.  She 
exists.  Her voice and her needs must be heard.  And her life, (no matter 




87 Contrast this idea with the court’s ruling in In Re A.C., where the potentiality of 
the fetus was chosen over the life of the pregnant woman who was dying.  See 533 
A.2d 611, 617 (D.C. 1987). 
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